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Abstract:
This is chapter 4 of Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance, and
Diversity (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming in 2015). In this chapter I investigate the
quota-based approach to achieving gender balance in corporate boardrooms. Quotas and
related target-based measures for publicly traded firms are currently in place in a number of
countries, including Iceland, Belgium, France, Italy, and Norway and are at different stages
of consideration in other jurisdictions, including Canada, the European Union, and Germany.
I present findings from my qualitative, interview-based study of Norwegian corporate
directors in order to provide empirical elucidation of how quota-based regimes operate in
practice. The identity narratives of Norwegian board members offer particularly rich sources
of insight, given that Norway was the first jurisdiction to pursue the quota path and thus has
the most mature quota regime. While highly contentious when adopted, the Norwegian
quota project unquestionably set the stage for subsequent legislative developments in other
countries.
I delve into the lived experiences of Norwegian directors who gained appointments as a
result of Norway’s quota law, as well as those who held appointments before the law was
enacted. Several questions frame my investigation. How have these individuals subjectively
experienced, and made sense of, this intrusive form of regulation? How does legally
required gender diversity affect their economic and institutional lives? And how has it
shaped boardroom cultural dynamics and decision making, as well as the overall governance
fabric of the board?
The forced repopulation of boards along gender lines has disturbed the traditional order of
corporate governance systems, dislocating established hierarchies of power in key marketbased institutions. Norway represents the paradigmatic case of this disturbance and has set
in motion a wave of corporate governance reform unlike any other. As such, it constitutes a
fascinating and appropriate case study through which to consider the implications of quota
regimes.
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CHAPTER 4
NORWAY’S SOCIO-LEGAL JOURNEY: A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF BOARDROOM DIVERSITY QUOTAS
Introduction
In this chapter I present findings from my qualitative study of Norwegian corporate directors in
order to provide some empirical elucidation of how quota-based regimes operate in practice. As I
explain in more detail below, I interviewed male and female directors with a view to understanding their
lived experiences both before and after the quota law came into effect. In the pages that follow, I
explore in detail the rich set of responses elicited from my interviews. Some of my salient findings
include:


The societal acceptance of Norway’s quota law has been to some degree a function of Norway’s
political culture and commitment to egalitarianism.



Over time, support for the quota law amongst directors it affects has increased. Directors’ views
changed after they witnessed the law in action, experienced its effects, and came to the
realization that change in the boardroom would require legal intervention, given the dynamics
of in-group favoritism and closed social networks that thwart diversity.



The dominant narrative my interviewees conveyed was that quota-induced gender diversity has
positively affected boardroom work and firm governance. Generally, respondents emphasized
the range of perspectives and experiences that women bring to the board, as well as the value
of women’s independence and outsider status. They also stressed women’s greater propensity
to engage in more rigorous deliberations, risk assessment, and monitoring.



Most directors provided concrete examples of how, in their view, diversity had made a
difference to Norwegian firms. These examples included a range of outcomes, from helping
boards make difficult decisions (such as firing the CEO and handling crises), to having an impact
in more functional areas (such as redesigning product marketing strategies).



The presence of a critical mass of women matters to the achievement of diversity-related
outcomes. And, in part because of the critical mass the quota law requires, women overall
reported that they did not feel stigmatized. Though their stories are complex, the majority
characterized the quota as a positive mechanism, one that facilitated their entry to the upper
echelons of the corporation.

Together my findings suggest a case for a modified business rationale. Women’s presence on
the board, at a critical mass, can enhance boardroom decision making and the board’s overall
governance culture. These positive effects were achieved as a result of the quota law, which has also
democratized access to a space previously unavailable to women. On these fronts, I judge the quota law
a success to date. That said, the lived reality of the law also raises a number of difficult questions and
unresolved issues regarding the value of board diversity and how best to achieve it. I explore my
conclusions, and these complexities, in more detail in chapter 5. Here, I focus instead on the particular
experiences of directors that I uncover in my study.
In general, little is known about the operation of quota regimes around the world. In recent
political science work on the spread of gender quotas in political life, scholars note the existing
2
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speculation on the likely impact of these measures. Advocates and detractors each opine that the
mandates will alter the effectiveness and dynamics of political parties and institutions in some way—
whether for better or worse. The speculation remains largely uncorroborated, however, and our
knowledge is incomplete at best.1
We know even less about quotas in the corporate context, given that these laws have been
enacted more recently. The study I present in this chapter seeks to remedy that gap. There are many
unresolved questions in the debate over quotas as an ameliorative remedy. Given the range of sociopolitical contexts in which quotas have been implemented, and the diversity of individual experiences
and organizational cultures within these contexts, it may be impossible to reach definitive or universal
conclusions about quotas’ effects. But we can at least deepen our understanding through empirical
investigation of the quota experiences already initiated, so that analysis, rather than conjecture, informs
the debate.
In this part of my study, I move past the numerical impact quotas have had on corporate boards
to probe more deeply into their actual meaning and effects. Using a qualitative methodology, with a
phenomenological lens,2 I seek to replace speculation with an account of real-life boardroom reality.
Returning to the themes laid out in chapter 1, I am interested in exploring corporate governance’s
human elements3 and am particularly interested in illuminating law’s role in transforming the board’s
“decision-making culture.”4 Before doing so, I place the Norwegian quota law in socio-political context
and briefly explain the design of my research.5
Norway’s quota law in context
The Nordic corporate governance structure “lies between” the unitary (Anglo-Saxon) and dual
(continental European) systems6 and has been characterized as a “one and a half-string system.”7
Norwegian corporate law specifies that the board of directors has both management8 and supervisory
functions.9 Daily management responsibilities are statutorily assigned to a “general manager”— in other
1

Mona Lena Krook & Pär Zetterberg, “Electoral Quotas and Political Representation: Comparative Perspectives”
(2014) 35:1 Int’l Pol Sci Rev 3 at 4.
2
See generally Clark Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, Cal: SAGE, 1994).
3
Morten Huse, Boards, Governance and Value Creation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 209.
4
Ibid at 208.
5
For a review of previous studies on the Norwegian quota law’s effects on corporate governance, see Morten
Huse, “The ‘Golden Skirts’: Lessons from Norway about Women on Corporate Boards of Directors” in Stefan
Gröschl & Junko Takagi, eds, Diversity Quotas, Diverse Perspectives: The Case of Gender (Farnham, England: Gower,
2012) 11 at 15-16 (characterized by the author as “few”).
6
Beate Sjåfjell & Cecilie Kjelland, “Norway: Corporate Governance on the Outskirts of the EU” in Andreas M
Fleckner & Klaus J Hopt, eds, Comparative Corporate Governance: A Functional and International Analysis (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 702 at 713-14. See also Danish Corporate Governance Committee et al,
“Corporate Governance in the Nordic Countries” (April 2009) at 8, online: Iceland Chamber of Commerce
<www.vi.is/files/Nordic%20CG%20-%20web_1472238902.pdf>.
7
Inger Marie Hagen, “Employee-Elected Directors on Company Boards: Stakeholder Representatives or the Voice
of Labour" in Roger Blanpain et al, eds, Rethinking Corporate Governance: From Shareholder Value to Stakeholder
Value (Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 2011) 121 at 128.
8
Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, Del K:1, no 45 of 13 June 1997, s 6-12(1) [translated by the law
firm Schjødt] [Norway] (“The management of the company pertains to the board of directors. The board of
directors shall ensure a proper organization of the business of the company.”).
9
Ibid, s 6-13(1) (“The board of directors shall supervise the day-to-day management and the company’s business in
general.”).
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words, a CEO—who must abide by the board’s directions.10 The general manager typically appoints the
remainder of the high-level management team.11
Companies with two hundred or more employees must have an additional supervisory body
called a corporate assembly,12 unless the firm and the majority of its employees consent to omitting it.13
The corporate assembly must have twelve or more members.14 It is this optional corporate assembly
that comprises the “one-half” element of Norway’s board structure; its tasks include electing the
board’s chair and its directors15 and supervising the CEO and the board,16 which, as noted, itself also has
both supervisory and management duties.
The current iteration of the Norwegian quota law (described in chapter 3) has a rather
complicated and technical past. Norway’s formal legislative journey began with measures passed in
2003, which applied a quota to state-owned and municipal companies and to companies incorporated
by special legislation.17 Soon after, Norway took steps to extend these measures to public limited
liability companies, known in Norway as allmennaksjeselskap or “ASA” firms. Private limited liability
companies, known as aksjeselskap, or “AS” firms, do not fall under the quota regime’s umbrella.
The law vis-à-vis ASA firms evolved in three phases. Prior to January 1, 2004, Norwegian public
companies were not subject to any form of quota-based regulation. In phase 1 (January 1, 2004–
December 31, 2005), under a government-industry agreement, compliance with the quota law was
voluntary. During this period, the government gave firms the opportunity to address gender imbalances
within their governance structures without formal state intervention. However, a Statistics Norway
study revealed that by the prescribed deadline during phase 1 (July 1, 2005), only 68 of 519 (13.1
percent) of ASA companies had reached the intended levels of representation. By that date,
approximately 16 percent of directors were female, much lower than the government’s expectation.18

10

Ibid, s 6-14(1) (“The general manager is in charge of the day-to-day management of the company’s business and
shall comply with the guidelines and instructions issued by the board of directors.”).
11
Sjåfjell & Kjelland, supra note 6 at 714.
12
Norway, supra note 8, s 6-35(1). Subsection 6-40(1) provides that companies’ articles of association can establish
an assembly even if not required under the statute.
13
Ibid, s 6-35(2). Additionally, companies in the financial, shipping, media, and extractive sectors are not subject to
this requirement. See Øyvind Bøhren & R Øystein Strøm, “The Value-Creating Board: Theory and Evidence” (2005)
at 15, online: BI Norwegian Business School
<http://web.bi.no/forskning/papers.nsf/0/b1b4fc5811a7c54cc125709900418106/$FILE/2005-08-bohrenstrom.pdf>.
14
Norway, supra note 8, s 6-35(1). If the assembly has more than twelve members, the total number of members
must be divisible by three. Two-thirds of the assembly is elected by the general shareholders’ meeting and the
remaining one-third by the employees from amongst themselves. See subsections 6-35(1), (3), and (4),
respectively.
15
Ibid, s 6-37(1).
16
Ibid, s 6-37(2).
17
Act of 19 December 2003 No 120, Part XII, para 1; Norway, Royal Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, “Followup to the Package Meeting of 9 to 10 November 2005 Regarding Representation of Both Sexes on Company
Boards” at 3, online:
<http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/BLD/Engelsk/Balanced%20gender%20representation%20on%20company%20
boards/Svarbrev_til_ESA_19122005.pdf>.
18
Norwegian Mission to the EU, “Norway’s Mixed Gender Boardrooms” (8 June 2009), online: <http://www.eunorway.org/news/gender_rep_boardrooms/>.
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In response, the Norwegian government made quotas compulsory beginning on January 1, 2006.
In phase 2, from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2007, all existing ASA firms were provided a two-year
transitional period to reach the representation levels the quota law required or face potential
dissolution. All newly incorporated firms, however, had to demonstrate immediate compliance with the
quota. Finally, since January 1, 2008, all firms have been required to comply with the quota (phase 3).
Notably, all corporations have achieved conformity.19
Others have canvassed the details of the quota law’s political advancement and the ensuing
public deliberations.20 At a general level though, the seeds of the law were initially planted in 1999,
during discussions pertaining to the reform of Norway’s gender equality legislation.21 During the
consultative process, the location of the proposed quota shifted from the Gender Equality Act to
Norway’s corporate law.22 Interestingly, while the rationale of gender egalitarianism was certainly
present in the political discourse surrounding the law, it appears that the primary discourse centered on
firm competitiveness.23 Considerable credit has been given to the leadership of Ansgar Gabrielsen, the
former minister of trade and industry of Norway’s center-right Conservative Party, particularly in the
final chapter of the quota’s legislative journey.24 According to the story, Gabrielsen telephoned a
reporter with the country’s most-read news outlet and requested a meeting. During the interview,
which occurred immediately prior to the coalition government’s closing debate on the quota law,
Gabrielsen revealed his abhorrence for the influence and control that men exercised in Norwegian
corporate culture. Apparently, Gabrielsen elected not to confer with any political colleagues prior to the
interview. His comments marked a turning point, effectively muting the Party members who were most
opposed to the law.25 In the interviews I conducted with Norwegian directors, a number of participants
stressed the importance of this moment, one characterizing it as a bold “coup”:
[H]e knew he would get heavy hits, because that’s the most unusual thing to do as a
minister . . . at least [as] the minister of trade in a conservative coalition. . . . And him
being a right-wing conservative. But that’s how it all started. . . . [A]nd then the battle
began, but . . . the whole government had to stand behind him! . . . That’s the most
amazing story you will ever hear. And it needs to go into your book (laughing).26

19

Anne Kjølseth Ekerholt & Carmen Di Marino, “Norway” in Paul Hastings LLP, “Breaking the Glass Ceiling: Women
in the Boardroom”, 3d ed (2013), 94 at 96, online:
<http://www.paulhastings.com/genderparity/pdf/Gender_Parity_Report.pdf>.
20
See e.g. Mari Teigen, “Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards in Norway: Innovative Gender Equality Policy” in
Colette Fagan, Maria C González Menéndez & Silvia Gómez Ansón, eds, Women on Corporate Boards and in Top
Management: European Trends and Policy (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 70 at 78-82.
21
Ibid at 78.
22
Ibid at 78-79.
23
Hilde Bjørkhaug & Siri Øyslebø Sørensen, “Feminism without Gender? Arguments for Gender Quotas on
Corporate Boards in Norway” in Fredrik Engelstad & Mari Teigen, eds, Firms, Boards and Gender Quotas:
Comparative Perspectives, vol 29 (Bingley, UK: Emerald, Comparative Social Research, 2012) 185 at 198-99.
24
Teigen, supra note 20 at 79.
25
Ibid; Morten Huse, “The Political Process Behind the Gender Balance Law” in Silke Machold et al, eds, Getting
Women on to Corporate Boards: A Snowball Starting in Norway (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013) 9 at 11-12.
26
Interviewee 8, Transcript, at 14-15.
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Gabrielsen’s own reflections underscore the salience of his chosen course of action: “If I had told them
before, the initiative would have been killed by one committee after another. . . . I had to employ
terrorist tactics. Sometimes you have to create an earthquake, a tsunami, to get things to change.”27
Research design
A.

Access and trust

As discussed in chapter 1, in order to understand quota-based corporate governance regulation,
it is necessary to explore the lived realities of the board members it directly affects. How have they
experienced this interventionist form of regulation? How does legally required gender diversity affect
their economic and institutional lives? Conducting this exploration, however, is very challenging. Boards
of directors are often small, socially similar, and closely bonded units.28 They are elite decision-making
entities that engage with highly sensitive topics.29 Their members lead busy professional lives. It is not
surprising, then, that boards are notoriously difficult for outsiders to access for academic investigation30
and have been analogized to “black boxes”31 and “fortresses.”32 Directors may be hesitant to offer their
rare spare minutes and insights to those who have not established a preexisting relationship of trust—
especially with regard to delicate issues such as diversity.33
Mindful of these difficulties, I employed a range of strategies to develop a sample population of
Norwegian directors whom I could interview. Relying on professional contacts, I first established a small
initial set of interview participants. I then utilized a referral technique known as snowball sampling to
identify additional interviewees. After conducting each initial interview, I asked the participant if she or
he would be willing to identify or reach out to a director colleague who might be interested in speaking
with me. This nonprobability sampling method is especially helpful in studies where it is challenging to
access population members,34 such as sex workers, gang members, the homeless,35 and professional
elites such as high-ranking members of government and executives of private institutions.36 Researchers
studying corporate board diversity have used it to great effect.37 I provide additional detail on the
strategies I used in the appendix.

27

Christine Toomey, “Quotas for Women on the Board: Do They Work?”, The Sunday Times (8 June 2008), online:
<http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/style/article96924.ece>.
28
Rakesh Khurana & Katharina Pick, “The Social Nature of Boards” (2005) 70:4 Brook L Rev 1259 at 1266.
29
Richard Leblanc & Mark S Schwartz, “The Black Box of Board Process: Gaining Access to a Difficult Subject”
(2007) 15:5 Corp Governance: Int’l Rev 843 at 847, 850.
30
Ibid at 846.
31
David SR Leighton & Donald H Thain, Making Boards Work: What Directors Must Do To Make Canadian Boards
Effective (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997) at xv; Catherine M Daily, Dan R Dalton & Albert A Cannella, Jr,
“Corporate Governance: Decades of Dialogue and Data” (2003) 28:3 Academy Mgmt Rev 371 at 379.
32
Ibid at 378.
33
Lissa L Broome, John M Conley & Kimberly D Krawiec, “Dangerous Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board
Diversity” (2011) 89:3 NCL Rev 759 at 769 [Broome, Conley & Krawiec, “Dangerous Categories”].
34
Colin Robson, Real World Research, 3d ed (Padstow, Great Britain: John Wiley, 2011) at 274-76.
35
Russell K Schutt, Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of Research, 7th ed (Thousand Oaks,
Cal: SAGE, 2012) at 158.
36
Robert Mikecz, “Interviewing Elites: Addressing Methodological Issues” (2012) 18:6 Qualitative Inquiry 482 at
491.
37
See e.g. Broome, Conley & Krawiec, “Dangerous Categories”, supra note 33 at 768-69.
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B.

Profile of the sample population

My final sample consisted of twenty-three in-depth, semi-structured interviews with directors of
Norwegian corporate boards.38 Of the participants, twenty-one were Norwegian, one was Swedish, and
one was a non-Scandinavian citizen who had been resident in Norway for many years. All interviewees
had direct or indirect experience with Norway’s corporate “quotations”—what North Americans would
refer to as “quotas.”39 The vast majority (95.6 percent) had first-hand experience with the quota: at the
time of the interview, twenty-two directors were either sitting members of ASA company boards subject
to the mandatory law (“quota boards”) or had previously sat on a quota board. One director did not
have past or present experience sitting on a quota board, but explained that the law nonetheless
influenced some of her nonquota (private company) appointments, in the sense that she believed she
obtained the positions as an indirect result of the law. Overall, the sample includes directors who held
appointments during each of the developmental phases discussed above. Nine respondents (39.1
percent) sat on ASA boards prior to the beginning of the quota law period. The breadth of experience in
my sample therefore provided me not only with rich data regarding the current regulatory climate, but
also with valuable points of comparison between this climate and the period prior to the law’s
enactment. Table 4.1 presents a breakdown of the respondents’ overall board experience during each
phase, disaggregated by gender. Table 4.2, also disaggregated by gender, provides information on when
participants received their first ASA appointment.
Table 4.1 – Sample’s overall ASA board experience by quota phase

Prequota:
Experience with
ASA board(s) prior
to quota law (preJanuary 1, 2004)

Female
Male
Aggregate

4
5
9 (39.1%)

Phase 1:
Experience with ASA
board(s) during
voluntary period
(January 1, 2004–
December 31, 2005)

Phase 2:
Experience with ASA
board(s) during
transitional period
(January 1, 2006–
December 31, 2007)

6
5
11 (47.8%)

13
6
19 (82.6%)

Phase 3:
Experience with ASA
board(s) during
mandatory period
(January 1, 2008–date
of interview)

15
7
22 (95.7%)

Table 4.2 – Sample’s first ASA board appointment by quota phase

Prequota:
First appointed to
ASA board(s) prior
to quota law (preJanuary 1, 2004)

Female
Male
Aggregate

4
5
9 (39.1%)

Phase 1:
First appointed to ASA
board(s) during
voluntary period
(January 1, 2004–
December 31, 2005)

3
1
4 (17.4%)

Phase 2:
First appointed to ASA
board(s) during
transitional period
(January 1, 2006–
December 31, 2007)

6
0
6 (26.1%)

38

Phase 3:
First appointed to ASA
board(s) during
mandatory period
(January 1, 2008–date
of interview)

2
2
4 (17.4%)

Ruth Sealy, “Changing Perceptions of Meritocracy in Senior Women’s Careers” (2010) 25:3 Gender Mgmt: Int’l J
184.
39
Kate Sweetman, “Norway’s Boards: Two Years Later, What Difference Do Women Make?”, Fast Company (13
July
2009),
online:
<www.fastcompany.com/1308538/norway%E2%80%99s-boards-two-years-later-whatdifference-do-women-make>.
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The sample reported approximately ninety-five quota board appointments in total (current and
prior), at more than seventy respective corporations.40 These figures reflect the fact that some
respondents served on the same boards and some held multiple directorships. Their positions were in a
wide range of commercial industries, including: finance and insurance; resource extraction; property
and real estate; shipping; agriculture; technology; automotive; media and communications; education;
healthcare; human resources; hospitality; pulp and paper; and retail. The sample possesses board
experience on small, medium, and large capitalization corporations. Some of Norway’s most prominent
companies are represented, including firms listed in the Forbes Global 2000. My sample also had varied
levels of professional experience: The most senior director’s public company board service spanned
twenty years, while the most junior director had sat on such boards for two years. The majority of
interviewees (fifteen, or 65.2 percent) had either CEO or senior management experience, though a
significant minority (eight, or 34.8 percent) did not. In addition to their corporate governance
experience, the respondents brought a wealth of professional backgrounds to the boardroom, including:
investment banking; consulting; law; line management in a range of industries; communications;
engineering; politics; private equity; and financial analysis.
Fifteen interviewees (65.2 percent) were women and eight (34.8 percent) were men. All were
White and ranged in age from thirty-eight to seventy-two years, the average age being fifty-two. The
average age of the female interviewees was forty-nine and that of the men was fifty-eight. Table 4.3
illustrates the age profile of the sample, disaggregated by gender. It was a very well-educated group in
terms of the highest degrees attained. Fifteen (65.2 percent) reported having earned a graduate degree,
such a Masters of Business Administration or its equivalent, another graduate-level business degree, a
Master of Laws, or a Masters in another field such as Arts, Science, Economics, and Engineering. Three
interviewees (13 percent) graduated from law school, and four (17.4 percent) held bachelor’s degrees.
Only one (4.3 percent) did not possess a university degree, though this respondent completed some
university-level courses. The majority of interviewees (approximately 70 percent) reported having a
spouse or partner and/or children.
Table 4.3 – Profile of sample by age and gender

Average Age
Median Age
Minimum Age
Maximum Age
C.

Female
49.1
49
38
61

Male
58.8
57.5
49
72

Aggregate
52.4
50
38
72

Data collection, analysis, and limitations

I approached each meeting with a flexible interview guide that set out particular questions and
key themes.41 I first asked respondents to discuss their individual and professional backgrounds. We
then discussed the corporate governance practices and policies of the boards on which they have
served; their experiences with, and views on, board diversity; and their experiences with, and views on,
the Norwegian quota regime in particular. We focused considerably on diversification’s effect, if any, on
boardroom cultural dynamics, governance, and decision making, and on the lives of female directors.
The conversations frequently took a direction of their own, as together we unearthed numerous
40

This figure excludes one outlier director, who reported sitting on an inordinate number of boards due to
structural issues associated with that director’s board positions.
41
Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, 3d ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 442.
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relevant issues. Mindful of the extensive conjecture regarding the effects of board diversity quotas, I
strived to draw out the respondents’ narratives in a manner “that allowed them to express themselves
in their own words and as ‘knowers’ of their own life stories.”42 I sought to “uncover, rather than
presuppose” the interview participants’ subjective truths.43
In qualitative research, phenomenological investigations center on “the meaning for several
individuals of their lived experiences of a concept or a phenomenon.”44 As noted, my primary objective
was to understand Norwegian directors’ lived experiences with the corporate quota law and the
phenomenon of legally mandated gender balance, with a view towards informing current international
policy debates. As such, a phenomenological lens was an ideal fit for the task at hand, and I used
phenomenological research methods to analyze the narrative data. In the appendix, I discuss the data
collection and analysis processes in more detail.
As Johnson observes, there is no consensus on the optimal number of interviewees for a
qualitative study.45 Much depends on the questions under consideration and the investigator’s goals. 46
That said, Creswell notes the literature’s recommendation that phenomenological studies include “from
5 to 25 individuals who have all experienced the phenomenon.”47 This study’s sample size (again,
twenty-three) fits squarely within this suggestion. However, given the relatively small population, and
the qualitative nature of the study, I do not suggest any statistically significant generalizations. This is by
no means a comprehensive investigation of the experiences of Norwegian corporate directors, and the
sample was not randomly selected—both are potential limitations.
That said, my sample enables an expansive and richly textured account of governance diversity
in Norwegian firms for several reasons: (1) its significant experience on different boards and at different
levels of the governance hierarchy; (2) its experience with the quota law at all stages of its development;
(3) its representation of a wide range of commercial industries and all levels of market capitalization; (4)
its variance in age and experience levels; and (5) mindful of the self-described limitations of previous
studies, its inclusion of both men and women,48 which provides perspectives from both sides of the
gender coin.
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Findings
A number of consistent patterns emerge from this exploratory, illustrative study. I discuss these
patterns, along with the other central results of the investigation, in the section that follows. Overall, in
these wide-ranging interviews, I canvassed a wealth of important topics relevant to the global board
diversity conversation. I have chosen to focus here on two particular themes and corresponding
research questions, which I referenced above and present more concretely in Table 4.4, below. These
specific subjects, I believe, are especially helpful in illuminating the deeper complex meanings of the
forced repopulation of boards along gendered lines.
Table 4.4 – Themes and corresponding research questions

Theme
1. Reactions to the quota law

2. The quota law’s meaning and
effects

Research questions
What were the overall societal and director-specific
reactions to the quota law?
What cultural and socio-political factors informed these
reactions?
How has legally mandated gender balance affected
boardroom cultural dynamics, decision making, and overall
firm governance?
Mindful of the discourse surrounding potential stigmatizing
effects, how have women directors subjectively experienced
the effects of the quota law? What has “invading” the space
of corporate governance meant to them?

A.

Societal reactions to the quota law

(i)

General acceptance

Participants reflected on the initial reaction of Norwegian society as a whole to the quota law’s
implementation and on how particular subsets, such as businesspeople, politicians, and the media,
responded as well. Many spoke of early resistance in the population at large, citing the commonly held
view that the law would be unsuccessful in practice or would cause insurmountable compliance
difficulties. Others noted that many in Norway were simply in a state of surprise or disbelief. A number
of interviewees suggested that the reaction of male corporate directors tended to be particularly
negative or skeptical. While an almost equal number felt that the male reaction was varied, and could
not be generalized, most who expressed this view also felt that whether Norwegian men supported or
opposed the law depended on whether, and to what extent, they perceived it as a threat to their own
board positions and to traditional modes of governance.
Nonetheless, despite a difficult adjustment period, the initial heated debate in Norway appears
to have largely subsided.49 While in some countries the prospect of such aggressive intervention in
corporate governance cultures is the subject of intense controversy, the reality of such intrusion in
Norway appears to have been generally accepted. One participant remarked that with “every year that
49
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passes, people get more used to [the quota law] and find it more and more natural.”50 Another
compared the quota law’s normalization process to a previously enacted law banning smoking in all
public places:
[I]t’s like the ‘no-smoking’ law in Norway. We were [one of] the first to ban smoking in
all public restaurants and the rest of the world thought we were [some] sort of crazy
police state. But now, a lot of other countries have done the same! And in Norway it
was so controversial, people were so angry, but after it was implemented, no one [has]
regrets anymore.51
While various dynamics likely account for this acceptance, almost three-quarters of respondents
identified three particular socio-political factors as playing an integral role in rendering the law
palatable. First, many interviewees felt that the two-year phase-in period allowed affected companies to
adjust gradually to the coming mandate and to prepare both mentally and practically for the changes it
would require. This gradualism served to reduce resistance and practical problems when the mandatory
quota came into effect. One participant suggested that the voluntary period was less of a factor than the
first-in-time quota for state-controlled firms. She suggested that the government’s willingness to apply
the controversial measure to firms in which it was a major owner set an example for the rest of industry.
Second, directors cited Norway’s political culture as an important determinant. Norway has a
strong tradition of political party quotas, wherein parties voluntarily undertake to meet a specified level
of gender representation amongst their contenders for public office.52 Beginning in 1975, Norway’s
Socialist Left Party adopted a 40 percent party quota.53 Since that time, four other prominent parties
have followed suit.54 Many of these respondents were of the view that these measures have normalized
the use of positive discrimination in Norwegian society, thus making the corporate quota less
controversial than it may have been otherwise. Some also opined that party quotas have led to
Norwegians becoming accustomed to women in positions of power; it is not anomalous for women to
hold such positions and to succeed in them, and they are respected for doing so.
Third, directors in the sample ascribed the successful internalization of the quota law, and its
overall effectiveness, to what one respondent referred to as the “philosophical underpinnings of the
culture,”55 in other words, to particular threads of the overall Norwegian social fabric. Most frequently,
participants cited Norway’s focus on egalitarianism and the presence of social democratic norms and
traditions. They felt these values led to a readier acceptance of the quota law and of the idea of genderbalanced boardrooms, and helped to ensure that a qualified pool of female directors existed. More
concretely, some observed that Norway’s overall corporate culture tends to be open and
nonhierarchical as well as encouraging of parental leave, flex policies, and work-from-home policies, and
that Norwegian companies already deal with laws mandating employee representation on the board in
certain circumstances (the codetermination system).56 Others noted that much of the female population
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in Norway is well educated, which means that women are active participants in the labor market and are
thus either qualified to serve as board directors or able to become qualified.
Also on this front, some discussed the division of household labor and childcare, pointing out
that government social benefit policies and general society norms tend to result in Norwegian men
absorbing some portion of household or childcare responsibilities. Participants generally suggested that
these policies and norms afford Norwegian women the necessary time and ability to develop their
careers and to seek out board service. Recent data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (“OECD”) supports interviewees’ observations about the division of labor. Of OECD
member states, Norway ranks second—after Denmark—in terms of male time spent performing unpaid
work, including housekeeping, caring for family members, and shopping.57 With respect to particular
state-related measures, the government’s current paid parental leave policy requires that the father
take a specific number of weeks (ten) and the mother take an equal amount. The parents may divide the
rest of the paid leave period as they choose.58 The official purpose of the “paternal quota” is “to
encourage fathers to participate more in caring for their infant.”59 So deep-seated is the commitment to
gender equality that Norway even has a gender-conscious kindergarten plan. Indeed, under the state
“Framework Plan for the Content and Tasks of Kindergartens,” consciousness-raising begins at a young
age: “The activities in the kindergartens must be based on the principle of gender equality. Boys and
girls must have equal opportunities to be seen and heard, and encouraged to join in together in all the
activities that go on in the kindergarten.”60
(ii)

Director support and a narrative of change

On balance, a strong majority (almost three-quarters) of corporate directors in the sample
indicated their own personal support for the law. This includes almost all female respondents and half of
the males.61 A minority either opposed the law or indicated a willingness to tolerate or accept it, or did
not express a clear position. The majority of directors in support of the law spoke to how their views had
evolved, presenting a robust narrative of change. Almost two-thirds of proponents reported that they
were initially opposed, hesitant, or agnostic about quotas. It was only after seeing the quota law in
action and directly experiencing its effects that they eventually came to endorse it.62 These results
resonate with the conclusions of the preliminary, survey-based study that Groysberg and Bell
conducted, which found that “contrary to popular belief . . . men in countries with quotas supported
57
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them in higher numbers than men in countries without them” and that “[n]early all the female directors
from countries with quotas agreed they were effective, versus about half of the female directors from
countries without quotas.”63 The remarks of two female directors are illustrative:
[I]t’s a really, really difficult question. At first, I thought, ‘What on earth is this? I don’t
want to be quota-ed into anything! . . . I’m sure you can imagine yourself, it doesn’t feel
very good that you’re recruited because you have to be recruited. . . . [S]o first I was . . .
negative. . . . [But] you have to do something extreme to get a change, like we’ve done
in Norway. . . . I think in general the people are happy with the quota laws, apart from, .
. . (mimicking) ‘We don’t like to be regulated.’ . . . It’s been positive. . . . I support it. . . .
[I]t’s been good for . . . the way [boards] work. 64
I’m convinced normally that quotation is not a good idea, and I’m skeptical to most
kinds of quotations generally. But what I see after this law has been effected, is that
suddenly there are a lot of clever young women that I didn’t know before. I hadn’t heard
about them, I didn’t know they existed. . . . [T]here was a tendency to what we call the
‘man’s club syndrome.’ You know: they ask the men . . . they go out with or have their
club with. So there was a self-recruiting system in a way, where the old men recruited
the other old men and suddenly you had the . . . very little group that was on all of the
boards. . . . [I]t’s been very refreshing to see all these young, clever, competent, strong
women coming out of nowhere and actually doing a very good job. . . . I didn’t foresee
that effect. And that’s why I’ve had to say that I have changed my perspective. I’m much
more positive to it now.65
Another respondent remarked that women who were originally opposed to the law were
“typically women that . . . had made . . . careers the hard way, . . . climbing the ladders without any
help, so to speak.” In this (female) interviewee’s opinion, these senior women had initially believed that
the law would push unqualified females to their level “without having to work for it.” These women,
however, subsequently changed their minds because of “how successful the quota law’s been and how
it’s actually been contributing to better quality in . . . the board’s work.”66
These reflections notwithstanding, a number of participants who endorsed the law also
expressed reservations, some mild and some strong. In general, when exploring whether they were
ultimately in favor of the law, most of the responses reflected a kind of internal monologue or struggle;
even if a director supported or opposed the quota overall, he or she still recognized negative or positive
aspects to it. As one female director commented: “I’m not completely comfortable with it still. It still irks
me. But I see . . . what’s happened and I think it’s very good, the result.”67 Interestingly, this internal
struggle sometimes appeared to cause respondents to question their own deeply held beliefs. In one
case, for example, a female director made it clear that she loathes governmental meddling in the private
sphere. Additionally, she expressed her disagreement with those who would suggest that board
membership is a “female . . . right.” That said, she ultimately supported the quota law because, in her
view, it was a necessary evil in disrupting the closed networks that had previously dominated
63
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boardrooms. It was almost as if she was grudgingly accepting that the free market principles she held so
dearly had disappointed her—and that the quota was a necessary correction of market failure.68
I was particularly interested in exploring whether a tension existed in the views of directors who
first received ASA board appointments prior to the quota’s implementation (“group one”) and those
who first received appointments during the transitional or mandatory periods (“group two”). Do the
men and women who entered the boardroom subsequent to the law have a more positive view of it
than those who had previously become directors? In analyzing the responses of both comparator
groups, group two expressed a slightly stronger preference for the law; eight out of ten in group two
indicated support for the law, whereas six out of nine in group one expressed support. That said, group
two also expressed stronger reservations. Overall, in considering the totality of responses, there does
not appear to be any substantial, noteworthy difference. Both the “new directors on the block” and the
directors who preceded them tend to speak favorably about the forced inclusion of gender diversity.
When asked if they would recommend quotas to other countries currently considering
regulatory possibilities to address board homogeneity, most directors (almost two-thirds) responded
affirmatively. Naturally, some of these respondents qualified their answer by adding that their
recommendation would be conditional on the presence of certain integral factors, such as the existence
of a sufficient pool of qualified, educated female candidates (harkening back to the socio-political and
cultural factors discussed above). Following from this, I asked interviewees about various possibilities for
the drafting and implementation of the quota law. Should the law have been crafted or operationalized
in a different way? While most were satisfied with the status quo, a significant minority discussed
alternatives, either because of dissatisfaction with the existing law or simply as hypothetical possibilities.
The most common alternatives they proposed included: (1) reducing the harshness of the penalty for
noncompliance by using fines, rather than dissolution; (2) providing companies with more time to reach
compliance; and (3) using a more gradual quota system with initial targets lower than 40 percent, with a
view towards eventually reaching 40 percent over a number of years.
B.

The quota law’s meaning and effects

To the extent that directors in the sample changed their minds about the quota law, such that it
now enjoys support,69 the natural question is ‘why?’ At the time of the interviews, the law had been
compulsory for more than three years. Did witnessing the law in operation cause a general shift in
opinion? Overall, interviewees provided a range of reasons for their endorsement of the law, including
that it has harnessed the entire talent or resource pool available in society; that it has been efficient, in
that it has increased the levels of female representation on boards in a short amount of time; and that it
has promoted equal opportunities for men and women.
Throughout the interviews, often without regard to the particular question asked, respondents
emphasized that the law had simply worked—it had achieved positive results. But what precisely were
68
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those results? A dominant narrative among participants, both male and female, was that gender
diversity has a positive effect on the process and substance of board decision making and the board’s
overall governance culture.
The gender-related benefits that respondents perceived can be broken down into the categories
of characteristics and outcomes. Characteristics are traits or differences that female directors are
thought to possess or bring to their board work. In identifying these attributes, some interviewees
initially expressed trepidation about gender stereotyping, but they then explicitly drew the connection
between gender and particular valuable attributes. Outcomes, on the other hand, are changes gender
diversity brings to the way members of the board work or to the way the board operates as a whole.
These changes could either appear as a direct result of increased heterogeneity or as the combined
effect of the various gender-specific characteristics identified. Not every response fit neatly into one of
these two categories, and a number of responses overlapped. Further, a small minority felt that the
overall perceived positive effects of gender diversity manifest either in specific situations only or when
combined with other factors, such as age. Nonetheless, these categorizations describe the overarching
impressions of the sample population.
(i)

Characteristics

The positive gender-specific “characteristics” that respondents identified fell into four
subcategories: (1) intellectual and experiential diversity; (2) diligence; (3) outsider status/independence;
and (4) style of engagement. Of these, the first three arose most frequently in the data; the fourth was
noteworthy, but less prominent.
First, participants offered a compelling account of female directors’ intellectual and experiential
diversity. Most felt that women bring to the boardroom, and to the decision making that occurs therein,
a different set—or broader range—of perspectives, experiences, angles, and viewpoints than their male
counterparts. As I discuss in more detail in the next section, interviewees believed a range of effects
flowed from the presence of this cognitive difference. Most typically, respondents said that diverse
perspectives and ideas provide a broader basis for decision making. Others felt that the presence of
varying perspectives contributes to long-term, stable value creation and preservation or the overall
long-term survival of the company.
With respect to why female directors in particular bring intellectual and experiential diversity to
the boardroom, most felt that there was something specifically related to gender at play. Women
directors either have uniquely “female perspectives” or have developed different perspectives from
men due to different life experiences or different employment and experiential backgrounds. One
female director emphasized that the value-added of this dynamic results from the balance achieved by
mixing the experiences and perspectives of women with that of men. After describing her most recent
CEO position as involving “a board of well, mostly men, all thinking with their calculators,” and noting
the benefits of the viewpoint range women bring, she observed:
[B]elieve me, . . . I know generalizations are wrong. . . . [B]ut . . . I think a board without
men, generally, would mean the company didn’t get anywhere. . . . Because they are
risk-seeking, they are out there, they are doing it, they don’t have [the] second thoughts
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that women tend to have. But if you balance these perspectives, you get better
decisions.70
Second, respondents presented a vivid narrative of diligence. Most frequently, they observed
that female directors are more likely than their male counterparts to probe deeply into the issue at
hand. They accomplish this via the assertive presentation of inquiries. Women, it was felt, ask more
questions, more challenging questions, more interesting and counter-intuitive questions, or even socalled “stupid” questions.71 Mirroring the findings of qualitative studies on US and Canadian boards,
interviewees suggested that males “are more afraid to show that they might not know everything. . . .
[T]o show that they’re not experts on everything.”72 This particular female director observed that
sometimes when women become inquisitive, “the men look very relieved, . . . [because] they didn’t
know [the answer] either.”73 Another male director stated: “[I]f you have a board with five people like
me. They’re all . . . from the same school, of the same age, they have the same background, they have
been studying finance. . . . [W]e tend to ask questions and we want to spend time on items we have a lot
of knowledge [on]. . . . If you have different experiences and a more diversified board, you will have
different questions asked.”74
Interviewees offered a range of responses when pressed as to why female directors probe more.
Some observed that women directors tend to be younger and in earlier stages of their career, or are
lacking in industry experience more generally. Interestingly though, only a few respondents offered this
view. More frequently, participants tended to attribute the inquisitiveness to the possibility that women
are uninterested in presenting a façade of knowledge and are loath to make decisions they do not fully
understand or take material components of a decision for granted.
Also on the theme of diligence, and consonant with the findings of previous qualitative studies,75
others pointed out that female directors are more prepared for board meetings (e.g., they read
documents more thoroughly), insist on more information prior to making a decision in order to anchor
that decision (e.g., they tend to seek more fulsome documentation), and are otherwise more
conscientious generally (e.g., they are more responsible and reliable, are willing to put in more effort
when required, and take their work more seriously).
Third, interviewees frequently portrayed female candidates as outsiders, or as existing separate
and apart from prevailing male-dominated board structures. Throughout the conversations, in addition
to using the outsider motif, respondents also utilized the related discourse of independence. Participants
emphasized that the law has severed or broken up close ties amongst directors, or between directors
70
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and other company players, such as the CEO and senior management generally. While some espoused
the virtues of independence at a general level, indicating that it is essential to good governance, many
others took this a step further by specifically linking independence with the idea of women as
“outsiders.” These interviewees suggested that female candidates often come from “non-traditional”
networks that tend not to overlap with those of men. Correspondingly, one female director described
the recruitment of female candidates as selecting “someone out of the inner circle,” “out of their inner
sphere,” or from “a little bit further away.”76
How did participants explain this outsider status? It stems largely from not being in the same
social networks as men and from standing on the periphery of specific sets of male relationships, such as
those based on sporting activities. Interviewees commented, for example, that men are part of “the
same golf club”77 or “golf clubs,”78 and generally are part of a “man culture” in which men have “things
they are doing together where no woman is involved,” such as “rotary” clubs, “hunting and fishing” and
“football games.”79 Further, interviewees used terms denoting the tight-knit nature of these male
relationships and their inextricable social element, referring to some male boards as a “gang of
friends,”80 an “inner circle,”81 an “old boys’ network,”82 and “a bunch of . . . buddies” or a “bunch of
friends” who “go out to have beers together every Friday.”83 One interviewee remarked on the pattern
of “friends recruiting friends into the boardrooms.”84 Another noted that the business world, specifically
the C-suite, is still mostly “a male community” whose social network is informal in that it is “like the boys
go out and have a beer.”85
Fourth, some participants observed that female directors tend to have a different style of
engagement. Their approach to leadership and decision making was thought to be more relational and
to promote a dynamic of participation and collaboration on the board.86 They are more likely to elicit
the opinions of others and to try to ensure that everyone in the boardroom takes part in the discussion.
It was evident that some female directors consciously viewed this approach as a means of more
effective communication. One, for example, indicated that a relational method gets her “opinion across
in a better way” and that she is “maybe . . . heard better.”87 Another suggested that employing such a
method in discussing possible alternative solutions or decisions “get[s] the other[s] on the board to
actually think more and to weight other possible solutions as well.”88 This participant contrasted such
behavior with what she perceived as a male tendency to “jump to conclusions” without necessarily
examining all implications or possible alternatives.89 A third described the gendered dynamic of
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participative decision making in the following way, simultaneously querying aloud whether the
perceived difference is best attributable to biology, cultural socialization, or both:
[I]t is my personal observation that men and women interact differently in the
boardroom. . . . [A] male [decision-making] round would be like the men are confirming
each other like a football team. . . . [T]he spokesman . . . utters an opinion . . . in a
matter, and the next man will simply confirm him. . . . [T]he decision . . . has been
understood and sometimes even communicated before the board meeting. So it’s only a
confirmation taking place in the boardroom. Whereas women . . . will come to the board
and be more interested in having a real work session where everybody utters their
opinion, you agree on something in the meeting. . . . I’m not saying that one culture or
working procedure is better than the other. They’re just different.90
(ii)

Outcomes

In this section, I discuss what my data show are some of the consequences of gender-based
heterogeneity for boardroom work and dynamics. Throughout the interviews, respondents linked some
or all of the qualities identified above with seven potential outcomes: (1) enhanced dialogue; (2) better
decision making; (3) more effective risk mitigation and crisis management; (4) higher-quality monitoring
of, and guidance to, management; (5) positive changes to the boardroom environment or culture; (6)
more orderly and systematic board work; and (7) positive changes in the behavior of men. Respondents
most commonly cited outcomes one through five, but also identified outcomes six and seven with some
frequency.
Of course, directors appointed after the quota law came into effect cannot meaningfully
compare current boardroom dynamics with those in place prior to the law’s enactment. Their limited
vantage point must therefore be taken into account when putting the data in perspective. Mindful of
this limitation, it was especially important to include in the sample directors who had attained their
initial ASA appointments prequota. As discussed above, almost 40 percent of the interviewees fell into
that category. As with the question of whether directors supported the quota law, I sought to learn
whether directors who had served on ASA boards before the quota came in effect (“group one”) viewed
the consequences of the law differently from those whose initial entry into the ASA boardroom came
during the transitional or mandatory period (“group two”). Once again, there was little tangible
difference between the “new directors on the block” and the directors who preceded them. Seven out
of ten in group two believed that increased diversification had had a positive impact on board decision
making, governance, or culture, whereas seven out of nine held that view in group one.
I turn now to the outcomes highlighted above. First, many respondents contended that gender
diversity promotes enhanced dialogue. Interviewees frequently spoke of their belief that heterogeneity
has resulted in: (1) higher quality boardroom discussions; (2) broader discussions that consider a wider
range of angles or viewpoints; (3) deeper or more thorough discussions; (4) more frequent and lengthier
discussions; (5) better-informed discussions; (6) discussions that are more frequently brought inside the
boardroom (as opposed to being held in spaces outside the boardroom, either exclusively or in addition
to inside the boardroom); or (7) discussions in which items that directors previously took for granted are
drawn out and addressed—where the implicit becomes explicit.91
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Second, and intimately related, many interviewees indicated that diversification has led to (or
has the potential to lead to) better decision making processes and/or final decisions. Here, respondents
focused on the enhanced quality of the procedure and the resulting outcome. Even when a diverse
board’s ultimate decision was not substantively different than one that a purely or predominantly male
board would take, respondents suggested that a diverse board would nonetheless engage in highercaliber decision making, more thoroughly canvass the decision’s implications, and act on a more
informed basis with better information, thus improving the decision’s implementation. One female
director illustrated these sentiments with the following remarks:
[T]here are more discussions. . . . [T]he women are the skunks. . . . They ask the difficult
questions, . . . they want to examine an issue from all angles or more angles. . . . [T]here
is less risk involved in the decisions [because] you have explored different aspects. . . .
[T]hey [women directors] are very conscientious, they prepare, they really want to . . .
do a good job. . . . [O]ften in boards, with the old boys' network . . . I say, “I’m sure
you’ve discussed this a lot of times before, but” . . . and I ask the question. And I see
them looking at each other. And you can see they’ve never discussed it!92
Third, interviewees frequently suggested, explicitly or implicitly, that the presence of women in
the boardroom informs risk mitigation or adds particular value during situations of crisis. On the first
front, a number indicated that boards with gender diversity tend to be more risk averse or consider riskbased implications more often or seriously. Some of these respondents explicitly attributed this to the
view that female directors tend to be more cautious or risk averse than males. Amongst these directors,
it was thought that female directors foresee and wish to address future problems sooner than their
male counterparts. Some framed this as thinking of “worst-case scenario[s],”93 while others framed it as
female directors trying to prevent future problems, such as preventing lawsuits or trying to reach
decisions that will prove useful not just in the moment but also a “few years down the road.”94
As with intellectual diversity, some took care to highlight the need to establish an equilibrium
between the “male” risk-welcoming behavior and “female” risk aversion that my interviewees
portrayed. On the second front, some participants highlighted female directors’ particular role and value
in making especially difficult and/or controversial decisions when the firm was in a state of crisis. One
female director was of the view that there is actually very little that distinguishes male and female
behavior during routine board work. However, she poignantly spoke about how, in her view, this
changed during moments of crisis or emergency:
I feel in a couple of situations that were very, very critical, then I saw [the] difference
between how men and women behave. . . . I’ve seen situations where the women were
more willing to dig into the difficult questions and to really go to the bottom even if it
was extremely painful both for the rest of the board, but . . . mostly for the CEO. . . .
[T]he really difficult situations, [where] you think that the CEO has . . . done something
criminal . . . [o]r you think that he has done something negligent, something that makes
it such that you . . . are unsure whether he’s the suitable person to be in the driving
seat.95
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Fourth, many respondents drew a connection between gender-diverse boards and increased or
higher-quality monitoring of management and guidance provided to management. These directors felt
that heterogeneous boards tend to challenge management more, or to impede patterns of “groupthink”
(the tendency of persons in closely bonded groups to pursue consensus without critical evaluation and
without considering different possibilities),96 which, in turn, increases the probability of critically
engaging management. One female director, after positing that women are more likely to question
management and to be independent, discussed the pernicious effects of groupthink on board work,
stating that “men are more . . . afraid of exposing one another.” She attributed this to elements of what
she described as “man culture”:
I think there’s a man culture, in some way. . . . [I]f you go back in time, they have these
things they are doing together where no women are involved. They have this rotary,
they have . . . [these] clubs or organizations where . . . there are only men. . . . And they
have this hunting and fishing thing, and they have [these] football games, and . . . I think
they are . . . more afraid of exposing one another. 97
Some participants in this group also suggested that female directors request more updates from
management or CEOs and devote more attention to monitoring the implementation of strategy and its
progress. That said, as noted, responses falling into this group did not pertain exclusively to monitoring,
but also extended to the board’s role in counselling and assisting management. Participants spoke of the
connections between diversity and the ability to “guide management.”98 As one female director stated:
I try to support management. I feel a lot of times most board members in general are
much more concerned about finding some fault in the materials, fault in their
arguments . . . and try to control and regulate . . . what the . . . [management] is doing. .
. . I’m more concerned with trying to support management and trying to encourage
them, trying to help them be motivated. . . . And I think that . . . has to do with me being
a woman.99
Fifth, interviewees often offered the view that diversification had changed the overall
boardroom environment or culture. Most frequently, this meant that the atmosphere around the board
table was more open, less severe, and one in which directors felt comfortable or “safe” contributing to
board discussions and asking questions.100 This includes increased tolerance of varying opinions. Some
respondents also mentioned a more fun working atmosphere—that increased diversity has changed the
tone of board work, making it a more enjoyable, collegial experience, or that it has added a positive
energy to the work conducted. One director described this as a transformation to an “open-minded
board” that “opens up for everybody, regardless of woman or man.”101
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Sixth, a number of participants suggested that diversified boards lead to more professional work
cultures and to more systematized board work.102 The nexus between gender representation and a shift
to more structured, systemic processes was thought to manifest itself in a number of ways, including:
establishing or improving formal protocols, procedures and systems; clearly defining the scope or
mission of the board; ensuring that the board remains on task and follows existing rules and procedures;
ensuring that management prepares for board meetings and provides board members with relevant
information and an agenda; mandating formal meetings for certain tasks; making board meetings more
structured; requiring more information and documents; and ensuring that meetings are run properly.
Interviewees did not think the implications of such systemization were merely academic. One
interviewee, for example, drew on the case of a company that found itself on the front page of the
newspaper in a pollution-related whistleblowing situation. The firm “found out the hard way that [it]
didn’t have a whistleblower . . . procedure in place.”103 Linking this to the theme of risk discussed above,
she indicated that this kind of exposure would not have occurred with a gender-diverse board—that
“women on boards make sure that all these kinds of procedures are there.”104
Finally, some participants suggested that increased gender diversity on boards had induced
changes in the behavior of male directors or of management when interacting with the board. Some
participants, for example, opined that the tendency of female directors to be better prepared has
induced better preparation in their male colleagues or has led to an improvement in, as one male
director put it, “the normal male habits,” such that board work has become more systematic and
disciplined.105 Consistent with research findings in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, some also
observed a shift in tone, as male directors were thought to act in a less macho, stereotypically male
fashion.106
As respondents’ representations reveal, the characteristics of female board members I
described in the previous section have informed these outcomes to varying degrees. Of these
characteristics, outsider status was a particularly powerful factor, informing outcomes such as:
enhanced dialogue and decision making; monitoring and guiding management; risk reduction; crisis
management; and systematization of board work. Especially important for respondents was their
perception that outsider status breaks up close ties—what one male director even characterized as
“collusion.”107 This dynamic of severing social bonds purportedly occurred on two levels: first amongst
directors, and second between directors and the CEO or high-level management more generally.
Amongst directors, women’s outsider status led to more robust intraboard deliberations and to the
posing of probing questions that might embarrass or challenge other board members—questions that
intragroup members (male directors) would not necessarily pose to each other. Outsider status also led
to the provision of higher quality advice to CEOs and senior management and to more effective
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monitoring more generally; directors were more likely to voice important dissenting opinions and, at
times, make difficult and unpleasant decisions such as firing the CEO.108
(iii)

Concrete examples of diversity’s value

The results described above resonate with those in the excellent study Broome, Conley, and
Krawiec conducted regarding the views of US corporate directors on board diversity.109 The authors also
found that public company directors typically grounded their enthusiasm for heterogeneity in the idea
of viewpoint plurality and its production of more fruitful deliberations.110 They refer to this view as the
“Bakke narrative,”111 invoking the 1978 US Supreme Court decision concerning university affirmative
action. While the Court in that case declared the quota-based measures of UC–Davis medical school
unconstitutional, Justice Powell in his plurality opinion concluded that race could be a factor in making
admissions decisions in order to promote diversity. He wrote of the benefits of exposure to “the ideas
and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples” and noted that medical students from
diverse backgrounds “may bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas
that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding
their vital service to humanity.”112
My findings differ in an important respect from theirs, however. Broome, Conley, and Krawiec
observed that their sample provided “distinct echoes of Bakke,”113 but concluded that the narrative is
only “a theoretical narrative without concrete detail, a story without substance.”114 While espousing the
benefits of diversity at a surface level, when they pressed US directors in their sample for meaningful,
tangible examples, the directors provided none.115 This absence of particulars led the authors to pose
the question: “Why do our subjects, on the one hand, affirm board diversity as a goal while, on the
other, they offer little substantive justification for pursuing it?”116 The authors speculate as to the cause,
advancing the following possibility:
Perhaps the Bakke narrative has achieved a broad but shallow victory, a discourse-level
hegemony that has few consequences for thought or action. . . . [G]enuflecting in the
direction of diversity has become a routine part of polite and politically correct
108
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discourse. This has correlated with a modest increase in women and minorities on
boards, though their representation may have reached a plateau. But, to judge by our
sample, business people do not seem to be thinking very hard about the concept of
diversity, and so have not come up with a coherent narrative about why it is
important.117
My analysis of the data thus far suggests that participants in my study of Norway displayed a
very deep appreciation of diversity’s tangible value. A majority of my respondents, however, went even
further still, supporting their general observations of diversity’s importance with concrete examples
based on either first-hand experience or second-hand knowledge (from their impressions of other
boards or impressions they gained from directors at other firms and contacts). Most of these directors
did so immediately, in direct response to my questions. Others did so organically at other points during
the interview, without prompting. One interviewee needed time to let the issue marinate, before
revisiting it on his own in a different context and providing an answer.
Many who furnished concrete examples cited a prominent Norwegian company that had been
embroiled in a serious corruption scandal and noted the specific role that the firm’s female directors
played in addressing the controversy. One female respondent described the case succinctly:
[T]op management had paid bribes to get contracts. . . . But the board didn’t really want
to address it. . . . There were three independent female board members in that board. . .
. And they demanded . . . transparency and action. And it resulted in the CEO leaving the
company. . . . This would not have happened if they hadn’t been on the board. These
were strong, well-known female directors. . . . So that’s one example.118
For these participants, this firm’s experience represented an affirmative case of gender diversity’s
positive effect on governance.119
Others in the sample provided examples unrelated to corruption. One (female) interviewee
described her own careful, cautious approach to expansion during a bullish period for her company,
immediately preceding the 2008 financial crisis. Despite the momentum toward growth in the
boardroom, this director remained “very firm” in her apprehensions, on account of her concerns that
the board’s assumptions about continuing revenues might be flawed. As a result of this director’s
insistence and foresight regarding this risk, the company chose not to expand and, after the downturn, it
continued to do well while many of its competitors did not survive. When pressed further, this
respondent specifically attributed the quality of risk-consciousness to gender. Based on her experience,
she offered the view that women tend to be more “cautious” and to consider the “worst-case scenario,”
whereas men do not.120 Another (male) respondent recounted his experience on the board of a
company that had accidentally caused environmental damage. In his view, the female members of the
board put forth “several perspectives” in response to the crisis, thereby “broadening the scope” of views
presented in the discussions. For this director, this situation was a “good example” of how women have
added particular value to boardroom deliberations by increasing the range of perspectives considered, a
benefit that he said is strongest for “issues . . . which can be controversial.”121
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A third (female) director chronicled her board service in the banking industry and noted the
effects gender had on product marketing strategies: “I’ve noticed that there are totally different things
we focus on compared to the men. . . . [H]alf of the customers in the large banks are women but they
tend to have the marketing campaigns as if only men were among the customers.”122 In her view,
women directors have “had a great influence” on this dynamic, resulting in “a new way of thinking
around the customers.”123 She stressed that marketing campaigns with which she was familiar were
“affected by the fact that we were females” and that this change “happened several times . . . in more
than one company.”124 As she put it, “we have another, different everyday life, which gives us some
angles that the men do not have.”125 In a similar vein, a fourth (female) director recollected her role in
correcting a firm’s sexist online advertising. In doing so, she also attributed her reaction and proactivity
to her gender:
I had noticed that this company had these internet pages with lightly-dressed women,
to put it that way. . . . And I brought that up in the board. I said, “Hey, you guys . . . I
really think it’s the absolutely wrong thing to do, and it pulls the attention away from
the real story . . . .” . . . [A]nd they changed the practice. . . . [S]o that’s a very concrete
example. . . . I asked, “Why is it like this?” and . . . a man might not have reacted and he
would definitely not have brought it up as a problem. But I brought it up and they
changed the practice.126
It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to confidently account for the difference in the abilities of
US and Norwegian directors to point to precise examples of gender diversity’s effects on board work. It
could be that there is no discernable reason informing this discrepancy. It could be that Norwegian
corporate governance culture vests more power and authority in the board such that directors generally
have a greater impact on the operations of the corporation. Or, it could be that because the
representation of women on US public company boards is generally low, especially compared to quotabound Norwegian firms, there simply are not enough women to demonstrate an impact on governance.
These questions should inform future comparative research investigations.
(iv)

The benefits of critical mass

A notable feature of Norway’s law is its requirement that public companies comply with varying
degrees of gender representation depending on the size of their boards. As noted in chapter 3, if, for
example, a board has nine directors overall, there must be at least four men and four women. If a board
is larger than nine, both genders must constitute 40 percent of the total makeup, at a minimum. In
smaller boards with four or five directors, there must be at least two men and two women.127 The
requirement of gender balance thus ensures that women constitute a critical mass on corporate boards.
I therefore sought to learn whether the experiences of the directors I interviewed shed any light on the
value of having certain levels of female representation.
Critical mass theory, most notably advanced in Kanter’s landmark work on gender and
organizational cultures in 1970s corporate America, highlights the dynamics created by the presence of
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different proportions of different social groups relative to one another in different settings.128
Individuals who are present in only scarce numbers take on “token” status, while those who are
numerous achieve “numerical dominance.”129 For the former group, difficulties abound, such as
alienation and being cast as a representative for all in their group, and the possibilities for success are
much more limited.130 That said, “[a]s proportions begin to shift, so do social experiences.”131
The consequences for individual members of groups that have not achieved critical mass can be
significant and troubling. Outgroup members can experience profound isolation and feel pressure to
adopt the dominant group’s perceived characteristics. In a UK study, for example, female directors and
high-level managers working in male-dominated firm cultures have reported that they frequently felt
lonely and excluded, and that their male colleagues were unwilling to take steps toward shaping a more
inclusive, equitable atmosphere. Some reported that they were put into traps, subjected to sexual
harassment, or intentionally deprived of support from male colleagues to evaluate whether they could
cope. They faced a typical catch-22 of power dynamics: how to exercise power constructively, while
ensuring that male directors and managers were not made to feel threatened and vulnerable in a way
that would adversely impact the women’s careers.132
This dilemma caused women to experience an internal struggle in which they weighed the
political consequences of being too forthright. In navigating this tension, the women went through a
self-transformation process that gradually made them “tougher” as a means of self-preservation,
though some characterized this transformation as regrettable.133 In Canada, women directors have also
reported this sort of self-transformation, or shifting of behaviors to conform to stereotypically male
norms.134 Further, female directors of Financial Post 500 companies have recounted experiences of
social alienation that resulted in feelings of desolation and in reduced access to networks that would
provide key professional relationships and information. Surveyed board members have expressed the
feeling that male directors view them as mere tokens and, correspondingly, that they must “overperform” in order to gain legitimacy.135 In the United States, a survey of female inside directors of
Fortune 1000 companies reveals that particular business cultures entrench exclusionary processes that
marginalize and disempower women and thwart their full engagement.136 For the women studied, such
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processes included being shut out of significant meetings with clients and being micromanaged by the
CEO while conducting performance assessments of lower-level colleagues.137
As others note, Kanter’s original research focused on the relationship between low levels of
representation and trying work environments; it did not assert that more balanced levels would yield
different organizational outcomes.138 Subsequent studies utilizing the critical mass framework, however,
do make this claim,139 suggesting that outlier groups will exert tangible influence only after achieving a
certain degree of representation. When this occurs, their views and abilities may become more
entrenched in the organization’s deliberative processes—for example, as the individuals become more
socially integrated and are thus increasingly relied upon.140
Thus, contemporary studies applying critical mass theory suggest that the “numbers game” can
be an important factor in alleviating negative experiences and in facilitating women’s and other groups’
more robust and influential participation. In one empirical study of US boardrooms, the authors
concluded that “having three or more women on a board can create a tipping point where women are
no longer seen as outsiders and are able to influence the content and process of board discussions more
substantially, with positive effects on corporate governance.”141 An investigation of Israeli companies
found higher levels of engagement by both male and female board members “when a critical mass of
three women directors is in attendance.”142
The merits of critical mass theory are vigorously debated in various social contexts.143 In
Broome, Conley, and Krawiec’s study, the authors “found only limited evidence that a critical mass of
women affected board behavior in any substantive way,” except when it came to industrial relations–
related issues.144 In my study, after discussing the potential relationship between gender diversity and
board decision making and governance, I asked participants whether, in their view, critical mass is a
factor in realizing any diversity-related benefits. Overall, the majority of the sample indicated that
critical mass was indeed a salient factor.145 This includes a small number of responses where the
participant observed this to be the case, but suggested that some additional, accompanying quality was
also necessary, namely that the women constituting the critical mass be actively engaged. Further, of
those who responded positively, most felt that either two or two or more women were necessary to
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establish a critical mass.146 The following comments of a female director were particularly instructive in
linking the quota law’s required level of gender balance with the benefits of critical mass:
I think forty [percent] is perfect. . . . And the reason why I say that is that my experience
is that when you’re the single one being a female on those boards, you’re more [likely
to] adopt to the way the board has always done or performed their meetings, . . .
everything is like before, you more easily adopt to the culture already there. . . . But
when it’s 40 percent, you actually make a change.147
In some cases, my critical mass–related exchanges with female participants led to discussions of
whether the presence of more women on the board had made a difference to the interviewee at a
personal level. This catalyzed some poignant reflections on the experience of navigating traditionally
male-dominated environments. One respondent offered these thoughts:
I’ve been the only woman in very, very many situations, as I was early put into
managerial positions. . . . So I’ve been used to being alone, so to speak. And I can deal
with that, but it becomes lonely to be the only woman in a male setting. . . . [I]t’s not a
desirable position, really. And even if you disagree with other women, it just feels
better. It gives a feeling of comfort and ease and you don’t need to feel that [you must]
be on your toes . . . you know, say the right things or not say the right things, and that
[that] may be . . . used against you because you’re a woman. 148
This general theme of being a sole female director, or the sole female in other similar leadership
contexts such as government or senior management, came up frequently during the interviews and is
noted in social psychological literature to have negative effects on performance outcomes.149 Not
surprisingly, the majority of respondents who broached this topic described the experience with
reference to feelings of marginalization, expressing, for example, that: “it’s hard to be the single
skunk”;150 it’s “lonely” to be the only woman;151 one feels “more at ease” when one is “not the only
woman”;152 and that “[i]t’s tough to be a loner” and it is “a little bit easier, even if you’re high on
courage,” to have another woman on the board.153
Even the minority of female directors who indicated that being the lone woman was not a
problem for them personally nonetheless conceded that it was “better,”154 “important,”155 “very
146
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nice,”156 or “quite nice”157 to have more than one woman on the board. Some male directors were also
sympathetic, offering that “[i]t would be a disadvantage for one woman to come in as . . . the first
woman ever on that board and to be alone” because “she might find herself up against the old boys’
network,”158 and that “it could be very tough to be the only” woman on a board.159 I followed up with a
number of the female interviewees who indicated a preference for the presence of other women
around the boardroom table and asked whether this preference was dependant on the other female(s)
agreeing with them or sharing the same opinion. All directors who were asked this question answered
that their preference for, or the benefits of, gender diversity on boards did not depend on the other
female director(s) expressing concurrence with a substantive opinion. These results appear to be
consistent with the “stereotype inoculation model” found in Dasgupta’s social psychology work,
suggesting that the presence of “ingroup members . . . in high-achievement settings . . . function as
‘social vaccines’ who inoculate and strengthen fellow group members’ self-concept.”160
(v)

Compromised efficiency?

The majority of my sample indicated that gender diversity has a positive effect on decision
making and governance, which manifests itself through, for example, deeper probing into issues facing
the firm, asking more challenging questions of management and of other board members, and
producing more robust dialogue. But are there potential negative effects of diversity on the deliberative
process? Prior research in fields such as organizational behavior and finance, for example, suggests that
cognitive heterogeneity and the resulting give and take of differing positions can lead to increased social
discordance161 and may compromise the efficiency of decision making.162
I delved more deeply into the potentially Janus-faced nature of gender-diverse boards, focusing
on the possibility that the advantageous aspects of heterogeneity the sample perceived may actually
have had the unintended result of slowing down decision making or making consensus more difficult to
achieve.163 On this issue, while the ability to reach consensus did not appear to be a major hurdle, most
participants conceded that gender-mixed boards can take more time to do so. My respondents did not,
however, view this negatively. Of the directors who made this concession, the majority simultaneously
indicated that any efficiency loss was nonetheless beneficial for their boards given the higher quality of
the resulting decision. As one male director noted, “I think that’s valuable. If you reach consensus in a
few seconds, there hasn’t been any discussion. . . . You haven’t learned anything from that
discussion.”164 The rhetorical questions of a female director echoed this sentiment: “[W]hat’s the
156
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success of a board meeting? Is it that it closes at a scheduled time? Or is it that you made a good
decision?”165
Interestingly, another male director, while acknowledging the possibility of an increase in
deliberation time, placed the onus for any such increase and the resulting inefficiencies squarely on the
shoulders of management. In his view, women in the boardroom are asking more questions, probing
deeper, and requesting more documentation. But any inefficiency lies in the fact that management is
sometimes unprepared to meet these (reasonable) demands:
Interviewer: Does it take longer then, to achieve consensus?
Respondent: That would, I think, depend on how good the management of the
companies are in providing the necessary documentation . . . as part of the presentation
of the various issues. I think . . . if they are good at that, it doesn’t necessarily . . . require
more discussions or longer discussions. [So], I think I would say no. . . . [I]f [a decision]
goes over more board meetings, it’s not gender that causes that.166
This director, however, added that management is slowly “getting used to being better prepared” and
drew an unambiguous connection between gender diversity and board monitoring: “[M]anagement is
sort of getting to grips with the fact that young, well-educated women [are] coming on the board[s]
[and] are asking for more information. . . . So I think, as far as improving quality of documentation for
board decisions, I think that there’s been an improvement and I believe that is coming from gender.”167
(vi)

Opening networks, redistributing power

Much of the narrative data I presented above center on the effects of gender-balanced
corporate boards, as achieved through Norway’s quota regime. They paint a portrait of the ways in
which legally mandated diversification has affected boardroom cultural dynamics, decision making, and
overall governance. The portrait consists of numerous, interrelated positive impacts. But the quota law
has also arguably had broader social effects by redistributing power in Norwegian society. That
important power dynamics are at stake is reflected in the fact that many firms did not comply when the
quota was voluntary.
Female interviewees noted that some male directors were loath to “give away . . . power”168 by
surrendering their “privileged . . . leadership positions”169 to women and that males’ positions on boards
“were threatened” as a result of the quota law.170 One remarked that some male directors’ negative
reaction to the quota law was based on the reluctance to “giv[e] up something” and having to witness
that thing “going to young women instead of [to] themselves.”171 One male interviewee echoed these
observations, discussing how male directors recognize the contribution of female directors to
governance, “but not necessarily . . . [at] the expense of their own participation.”172 Further, some
directors felt that low levels of female representation in certain industries are rooted in the male power
165
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that would be lost in these particularly lucrative fields. One respondent, in discussing the extractive and
financial sectors, remarked that these industries are home to “the really, really hard cash” and thus
represent “the last border [that] will break.” In her view, men working in these areas are especially likely
to perceive women as “taking positions” and “claiming some of [their] power” and that “the higher the
stakes . . . the harder it is to get in!”173
At an operational level, the mandatory quota served to redistribute these positions of power in
several ways. As I touched on above, when noting the attributes of independence and outsider status
that women bring to the boardroom, many respondents discussed how the quota compelled boards and
nominating committees to extend their searches for new directors beyond the usual, traditional spheres
of comfort. Boards had no choice but to look outside of their existing networks and to search beyond
candidates with CEO and C-suite experience or directly related industry experience. In the words of the
interviewees, firms “have been forced to look in a . . . broader environment than . . . they traditionally
do.”174 The quota law “demands a wider search,”175 which means engaging networks that firms are
perhaps “not used to deal[ing] with”176 and expanding their “one-dimensional picture of what [a] board
member should be,”177 instead of preserving the usual dynamic of “friends recruiting friends into the
boardrooms.”178 Firms are now considering a “whole different corner than they ever did before” and
opening up a “whole new set of . . . relationships.”179 In doing so, they have “expand[ed] the
recruitment base” and effectively “doubl[ed] . . . the talent pool they are picking from.”180
In supporting the mandatory quota, some respondents indicated that, without it, recruitment
based on personal ties and similar backgrounds or characteristics would continue. These responses,
along with the redistribution effects my interviewees noted, highlight the salience of implicit cognitive
bias and closed social networks in blocking gender diversity, as I discussed in chapter 2. One director
specifically cited this theme as a reason for endorsing quotas over disclosure strategies, opining that
disclosure is too weak a measure to effectively break the pattern of in-group favoritism in recruitment:
“[I]t’s too tempting to . . . give [a board position] to someone that understands you, that will not
necessarily ask those difficult questions; someone that . . . is a little bit similar to you, and that you get
an advantage from [by] putting there.”181
This theme emerged prominently in the interviews. A significant degree of the support for the
quota law ultimately stemmed from the view that the law was necessary to diversify boards in a
meaningful way—an outcome most respondents supported. In perhaps one of the most telling set of
exchanges during my field work, I asked sample members if, in their view, the current levels of gender
representation achieved under the quota law would remain intact if the state were to rescind the law.
Only a thin minority felt that they would, while over two-thirds of the sample believed that the levels,
overall, would decrease. Interviewees did not agree on the timing or magnitude of this hypothetical
change. Some opined that the drop would be gradual, while others suspected that it would be
instantaneous. Some predicted the decrease would be slight, while others thought it would be
173
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significant. One participant said a decrease would occur in particular companies only. Despite this
disagreement, however, one thing was clear: The most frequently cited factor in explaining why the
levels would decrease was that of network-based barriers and in-group favoritism. One interviewee, for
example, stated that “it’s easier, more comfortable” and “quicker” for firms to pick a man for a board
position.182 Another felt that owners can more easily relate to a person who “seems to have basically the
same values or competence . . . and he’s been doing something which is similar” and stated that “the
network is still . . . heavily tilted male.”183
The redistribution effect raises the question of whether affected directors might have mixed
feelings about the law even if they see its benefits for boardroom operations. Even if diversification has
positive effects on company governance, the question remains: Why are quotas an appropriate
mechanism by which to achieve those benefits, especially given the intense controversy surrounding
them? Put another way, even if participants have provided a convincing narrative of governance
heterogeneity, why do they support (even if hesitantly) positive discrimination as a means of achieving
it? For one male director, the various benefits he associated with diversification still did not justify the
quota:
Interviewer:
So we’ve had a really good discussion about both the positives and the
negatives. . . . [O]verall, do you support the use of quotas for increasing gender diversity
on boards?
Respondent: No . . . but that’s more . . . a philosophical and political way of
reasoning. Because . . . I’m of the general opinion that you can’t introduce a legal
framework for everything you want to achieve in the society.
...
Interviewer:
What’s been achieved so far, all of the benefits that we’ve just talked
about, do you think they would have happened without the legal framework?
Respondent:

No. No. No.

Interviewer:

(laughing) So can you help me reconcile those two statements?184

This director, however, was in the minority. Most respondents thought that the quota law proved
justified because of its efficiency in increasing levels of female representation on boards in a short
period of time, and many additionally supported it because its mandate served the important objective
of utilizing the entire talent pool available in Norwegian society. Again, some interviewees further noted
that Norwegian firms did not heed the call to increase gender diversity (at least at any significant level)
during the voluntary period; compliance had to be mandated.
(vii)

The absence of stigma

In chapter 3, I noted that one of the major critiques of quotas is that they may stigmatize their
beneficiaries. In the United Kingdom, for example, a recent House of Lords committee report
recommended against pursuing quotas as a line of first resort because, among other things, the
182
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committee felt that positive discrimination “would risk fostering the perception—though entirely
incorrect—that women on boards were not there by merit.”185 The committee reached this view after
hearing conflicting evidence from witnesses. Some opined that quota-based measures are “patronizing
or tokenistic, and risk . . . undermining the perception of women in senior positions.”186 Others,
however, expressed the view that, “rather than being patronizing . . . quotas provided the means to
overcome structural inequalities in the labour market”187 and that “it was not . . . in the least patronising
to take effective steps to address the current bias in favour of men.”188 Similarly, in Canada, a leading
voice of institutional investors conjectured in a brief submitted to a Senate committee that “[q]uotas
can result in unintended consequences, not the least of which is the potential stigmatization of the
female candidates they are designed to promote.”189 This refrain has been echoed in various settings,
including in a policy submission by a consortium of corporations to the Ontario Securities Commission
(regarding the regulator’s proposed disclosure model),190 an influential report by one of Canada’s largest
banks (which also described quotas as “the antithesis of merit”),191 and the Canadian press.192
Mindful of the frequent speculation in policy conversations that quota-based regimes may have
a stigmatizing, isolating, and/or patronizing effect—a possibility many use to advocate against quotas—I
asked participants questions designed to learn: (a) whether the beneficiaries of positive discrimination
have been stigmatized or treated differently from male directors; and (b) whether those who serve on
boards alongside these beneficiaries perceive them to be stigmatized in some way. What has it meant
for women to “invade” the traditionally male space of corporate governance? After relative numerical
parity was achieved, what were the consequences for intraboard power arrangements?
Some participants observed that critics of Norway’s quota law predicted that it would stigmatize
beneficiaries, mirroring international policy dialogues. One director confessed that the possibility of this
sort of toxic repercussion was one of the reasons why she initially opposed the law. While she now
supports the law (with reservations), she also reported having experienced stigmatizing treatment,
especially from the press: “[T]hey tend to say, (mimicking) ‘Oh well, you just got this [position], of
course, because of the quotation law.’”193 Another female director recounted the following story about
a female colleague’s entry to the board of another firm:
Respondent: I’ll tell you one story. There’s a female lawyer . . . specializing in
shipping. She’s really very good. And . . . she came into this new shipping company
185
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board. And the chairman looked at her . . . and then he said, (mimicking) ‘Oh, and then I
see we have . . . Pippi Longstocking on the board.’ . . . Now her hair is red and . . . you
know, it was like, she . . . [says,] (mimicking) ‘Fuck you.’ – Sorry.
Interviewer:

No, . . . it’s okay.

Respondent: . . . [S]he’s a tough woman, but really, you know, it was not a good start.
. . . And he may not have meant it very badly, but, you know . . .194
Overall, however, only a small minority felt that these sorts of effects had actually come to pass
and were a salient issue, or at least speculated that stigma had resulted. And even amongst this
minority, not all respondents would characterize the differential treatment as occurring along gendered
lines. One participant, for example, felt that any newcomer to an organization will be subjected to
enhanced scrutiny and to the expectation that he or she “earn [his/her] spurs.”195 Contrary to critics’
initial predictions, the majority of the sample (slightly more than 85 percent): (a) did not observe
stigmatizing or isolating effects or differential treatment; (b) observed such effects, but in only a very
limited number of cases; (c) observed such effects, but did not think them salient or felt that they could
be managed; or (d) observed such effects, but for only a limited period of time, immediately after the
quota law was passed. This suggests that the benefits of the quota law have outweighed any
stigmatizing costs, to the extent that these costs have materialized.
Interestingly, one male respondent suggested a gendered dimension to the stigmatization
argument itself. In his view, men strategically employ it to thwart women’s progress, leading him to
characterize it as “a hopeless . . . male argument.”196 Another male respondent expressed the view that
the quota law had “normalized” gender diversity on boards such that it is now viewed as a “quality
stamp” of firms and part of how “a proper company should function.”197 This interviewee suggested that
the risk of stigmatization was a live issue only in the period immediately following the quota’s
implementation, but not after it became internalized:
[I]n the first year of the quota law, definitely it was looked upon . . . in a [certain] way
and I also think that even very qualified female members hesitated to take on board
positions because they were afraid of being stigmatized. But that has definitely changed.
. . . [Now] I think you’ll find that [women] are just as qualified, if not better, than most of
their male colleagues, actually.198
Given that respondents had offered vivid accounts of insular recruitment processes and
masculinist boardroom dynamics that predated the quota, one might think that women would
encounter resistance and stigma after taking their seats at the table. And yet, comments such as these
were not atypical: “I think that [stigmatization] was predicted, but I don’t think it has happened. I truly
believe that all board members are perceived and treated as professionals.”199 Perhaps the expressions
of sexism were reserved for outside the boardroom, in separate social spaces? Perhaps these
194
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expressions took the form of everyday microaggressions that were less conspicuous and in some cases
were not registered or taken seriously if they arose from ignorance or lacked malevolent intent? My
respondents suggested different explanations. Some, for example, explained the absence of stigma as a
function of critical mass. By mandating gender balance and foreclosing any possibility of tokenism, the
quota law made marginalization difficult, if not impossible. As one female participant remarked:
When you first enter that room, you’re treated as a board member, regardless of how
you entered the room. . . . At least that’s my experience. . . . And all the other females
I’ve talked to say exactly the same thing. Because when you’re representing 40 percent
in there, you can’t stigmatize 40 percent of the board. . . . [Y]ou could have stigmatized
one person, or 15 percent. . . . But you can’t stigmatize 40 percent.200
It is clear that female directors in the sample generally did not speak about the quota law in a
manner suggesting that it has had stigmatizing effects.201 The majority of female participants reported
that they felt comfortable on the boards on which they sat, identified and discussed what they
perceived to be their main contributions to their boards, and confirmed the feeling that their boards
recognized or appreciated their contributions. These results are consistent with the conclusions of
previous survey-based studies on Norwegian female directors. Elstad and Ladegard, for example, found
that women directors “perceive contributions of high levels of . . . influence and information sharing . . .
and low levels of . . . self-censorship,” results that “are not in accordance with the predictions of
tokenism theory, but are more aligned with critical mass arguments.”202 Mathisen, Ogaard, and
Marnburg further found evidence “that female directors are welcomed into boardrooms, not perceived
as out-groups, and [boards] are able to benefit from the female directors’ experience and skills.”203
Rather than employing a discourse of stigma or tokenism, the majority of my sample
characterized the quota as a vehicle that—in their lives—has facilitated access to the upper echelons of
the corporation. These interviewees used various terms to describe this facilitation. One remarked that,
post quota, she has been approached more frequently to join public company boards and that she is
“sure it helped [her] to get into the . . . set of candidates” being considered.204 Others described how the
law has “opened a fabulous opportunity”205 or has constituted “a huge opportunity.”206
Other interviewees were even more explicit. One commented, “I have no doubt that I would not
have had those [board] positions without the quota law . . . and that has been . . . understood. Not
directly communicated, but sort of understood. . . . And, frankly, I don’t mind.”207 Similarly, another
discussed how she had not held a board position until the quota law passed, and thus admitted that she
200
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got an “opportunity because of the law,”208 given that she did not think she “would have been on the
boards if it hadn’t been for this quota law.”209 I should note that both of these women were
unquestionably well qualified—one was a law firm partner with an impressive business law practice, and
the other had extensive prequota industry management experience. Interestingly, another participant
noted that the quota law afforded her access to a board of a company in a traditionally male-dominated
industry: “[T]he maritime construction firm, I would have never ever entered into that industry or . . .
been deemed suitable for . . . the board [of] such an industry, without the quota law.”210 Another
remarked that a particular board “probably wouldn’t have even known about” her if not for the
quota.211 This M.B.A. graduate had reached the partnership level at her firm and possessed managerial,
consulting, and financial analyst experience.
Conclusion
Overall, the dynamics brought to light in these interviews suggest that Norway’s quota law, as
an instrument of economic governance, has had a profound effect on Norwegian companies. It has
affected the social fabric and decision making culture of the boardroom, transformed overall firm
governance, and shifted the landscape of existing gender-related power arrangements. That said, the
lived reality of the quota law also gives rise to a number of interesting and difficult questions for future
research and of particular relevance to other countries contemplating the adoption of a quota regime.
These questions include: whether quota laws essentialize gender; whether the benefits of outsider
status will disappear as women gradually assimilate onto boards and into the networks of male
directors; whether quotas have a negative relationship with firm financial performance; whether
boardroom diversity will enhance diversity in the management suite; whether quota regimes can be
successful in countries with socio-political cultures that are different from that of Norway; whether the
benefits of diversity are tied to particular features of corporate governance cultures; and whether
publicly traded firms will attempt to avoid quota requirements by becoming private. I turn to these
questions and the surrounding issues in chapter 5.
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